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Does child labor decrease as household income rises? 
This question has important implications for the design 
of policy on child labor. This paper focuses on a program 
of unconditional cash transfers in Ecuador. It argues that 
the effect of a small increase in household income on 
child labor should be concentrated among children most 
vulnerable to transitioning from schooling to work. The 
paper finds support for this hypothesis. Cash transfers 
have small effects on child time allocation at peak school 
attendance ages and among children already out of school 
at baseline, but have large impacts at ages and in groups 
This paper—a product of the Human Development and Public Services Team, Development Research Group—is part of 
a larger effort in the department to understand the determinants of child labor. Policy Research Working Papers are also 
posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors can be contacted at eric.v.edmonds@Dartmouth.EDU and 
nschady@worldbank.org.
most likely to leave school and start work. Additional 
income is associated with a decline in paid work that 
takes place away from the child's home. Declines in work 
for pay are associated with increases in school enrollment, 
especially for girls. Increases in schooling are matched 
by an increase in education expenditures that appears 
to absorb most of the cash transfer. However, total 
household expenditures do not increase with the transfer 
and appear to fall in households most impacted by the 
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More than one in five children in the world are working.  Most of these working children 
reside in poor countries.  This paper is concerned with the relationship in poor countries between 
current family economic status and whether the child works.  There are two distinct strands of 
research.  The first considers whether working while young influences current economic status 
through the economic contribution of children to the household (Manacorda 2006) and child 
labor's impact on local labor markets (Basu and Van 1998).  The second examines whether and 
why current economic status influences the decision to send children to work.  Understanding the 
influences of economic factors on child time allocation is important for the design of child labor 
related policy and for understanding the political economy of existing child labor regulation 
(Doepke and Zilibotti 2005).  This second strand of research is the focus of this study, which 
examines child time allocation responses to experimental variation in family income from a cash 
transfer program in Ecuador. 
  In the recent literature on child labor responses to variation in economic status, there is a 
debate on the extent to which child labor responds to income among poor households.  Basu, 
Das, and Dutta (2007) provide a recent discussion of the state of this literature.  The theoretical 
literature has emphasized parental preferences (Basu and Van 1998) and liquidity constraints 
(Baland and Robinson 2000) as two reasons why there might be a strong causal relationship 
between poverty and child labor.  Empirical evidence faces the problem of establishing that 
causation runs from variation in economic status to time allocation decisions.  Many correlates of 
family income influence the economic structure of the household, and a large literature 
documents the impact of employment opportunities open to children on child time allocation 
(e.g. Fafchamps and Wahba 2006; Kruger 2007; Manacorda and Rosati 2007; Rosenzweig and 
Evenson 1977; Schady 2004). 
This study considers how child time allocation in Ecuador responds to receipt of the 
Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) cash transfer.  The evaluation of the Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano (BDH) program randomly assigned cash transfers to some poor households and not to 
others.  The BDH transfer is $15 per month, slightly less than 1/10 the monthly income of 
recipient households, and does not come with any additional conditions attached.  We use the 
random assignment from the evaluation of the BDH as our source of variation in economic status 
 
 
1in this study.  Our sample consists entirely of BDH-eligible households who are in the poorest 
two quintiles of Ecuador. 
We find that random assignment of the BDH income is associated with less work for pay, 
less involvement in the family farm or business, increased schooling, and fewer children working 
in some way without attending school.  Market work declines as schooling increases, but 
domestic work appears positively associated with the increase in income, although this increase 
is small and insignificant.  These findings are consistent with a growing literature that has 
documented that cash and in-kind transfers can reduce child work and increase school enrollment 
(e.g. Attanasio et al. 2006; Edmonds 2006; Filmer and Schady 2008; Ravallion and Wodon 
1998; Schultz 2004). 
Our paper adds to this literature in a number of important ways.  First, we provide a 
theoretical framework which predicts that there should be substantial heterogeneity in program 
effects.  Using an adaptation of the Basu and Van (1998) model, we show in section 3 that the 
effect on child labor of the BDH transfer should be concentrated among children most vulnerable 
to transitioning between school and work.  Specifically, our hypothesis is that for young 
children, for whom schooling is less expensive and the opportunity cost of time in school low, 
additional income is likely to have little effect on child time allocation.  For older children, 
already withdrawn from school and working, the cash transfer is likely too small to affect their 
time allocation.  However, for children in school and not working but facing the dramatic 
increase in schooling costs that comes with completing primary school in Ecuador and the rise in 
opportunity costs that comes with age, their time allocation is potentially substantially altered by 
small changes in non-child labor income.   
The findings for work for pay are strongly consistent with this theory.  The decline in 
work for pay associated with BDH receipt on average is concentrated in children most vulnerable 
to transitioning from work to school.  Older children in poor households, especially girls and 
children in rural areas who are at the end of primary school or higher in the baseline survey are 
most likely to transition to work for pay and stop schooling in the control sample follow-up 
survey, taken 1.5 years later.  It is this population of older children finishing primary or higher 
that experience the largest declines in work for pay and increases in schooling with the BDH 
transfer.  These findings for work for pay and schooling are consistent with the results from the 
PROGRESA program in Mexico, which appears to have an impact on school enrollment 
 
 
2primarily among children making the transition from primary to lower secondary school (e.g. 
Schultz 2004; de Janvry and Sadoulet 2006). 
Second, we show that the decreases in child labor occurred despite the fact that the 
transfer was substantially smaller than the sum of the direct and opportunity costs of attending 
school.  While the transfer is $15 per family per month, it is associated with an additional $9 per 
month spent on education for children most vulnerable to transitioning from schooling to work 
for pay outside of their family.  Average monthly wages for a child working for pay are $84 per 
month.  Thus, the foregone child labor income is greater than the additional education spending.  
Taken together, we do not see any significant increases in family expenditures associated with 
additional BDH income.  In fact, total family expenditures appear to decline for those whose 
work for pay is most impacted by the BDH transfer, those most vulnerable to transitioning from 
school to work for pay.  This empirical result is also a prediction of the Basu and Van (1998) 
model.  Families send their children to work for pay when they cannot afford their desired 
alternatives such as schooling without the child's economic contribution.  Our findings suggest 
that the BDH transfer of $15 per month allows families to continue the schooling of many of the 
children most vulnerable to leaving schooling for work for pay. 
The BDH program is described in the next section and we consider its effect on child 
labor in detail in section 3.  The main findings are presented in section 4.  We document that the 
randomized increase in income is associated with increased schooling and decreased work for 
pay in those most vulnerable to transitioning from school to work.  The changes in work and 
school are large enough that the net effect of the transfer for this population is to decrease total 
expenditures.  Section 5 concludes.  Our findings highlight the importance of schooling costs in 
the decision to send the child to work and illustrate considerable scope for small, targeted 
changes in family income to have large effects on the child labor situation. 
 
2.   Background on the BDH program and its evaluation 
Ecuador has had a cash transfer program, the Bono Solidario, in place since 1998.  
Recipient households received $15 per month per family.  While the intent of Bono Solidario 
was to assist poor families during an economic crisis, the program continued well past the 
economic crisis and the program was poorly targeted.  Bono Solidario was replaced by Bono de 
Desarrollo Humano (BDH) beginning in mid 2003.  A key difference between BDH and Bono 
 
 
3Solidario is that BDH is explicitly means-tested.  Starting in 2001, the government invested into 
developing a family means test, called the Selben Index.  Only families in the poorest two 
quintiles of the Selben index are eligible to receive BDH's transfer of $15 per month.  Another 
difference between the Bono Solidario and the BDH is that the launch of the BDH was 
accompanied with a social marketing campaign that encouraged households to invest in the 
human capital of their children.  However, unlike other transfer programs in Latin America, 
BDH transfers have never been made explicitly conditional on specific investments in child 
human capital (for example, school enrollment).  
  The rollout of BDH explicitly contained a randomized component in 4 of Ecuador's 24 
provinces.  Within provinces selected for the evaluation, parishes (counties) were randomly 
drawn.  Within these parishes, BDH eligible households were randomly sorted into BDH 
recipient households (lottery winners) and non-recipients (lottery losers).  Households formerly 
receiving Bono Solidario transfers were excluded from the evaluation.  Lottery losers were taken 
off the roster of households that could be activated to receive BDH transfers.  An important 
feature of this experiment is that, unlike the PROGRESA evaluation, randomization is at the 
household level, rather than the community level.  That is, within a community, we observe both 
lottery winners and lottery losers. 
  The randomization appears to have been successful in attaining balanced treatment and 
control populations.  Table 1 summarizes background characteristics of children and their 
families in treatment and control populations.  These data are from the baseline survey data 
collected between June and August 2003 before households were assigned to treatment and 
control populations.  Most of the background characteristics in table 1 appear similar.  The 
control population looks a little more likely to be female and urban than does the treatment 
population, but these differences are not significant at 5 percent.  We also consider our results on 
samples restricted to just rural and just female below.  
  There appears to be considerable leakage of BDH into the control population.  By design 
of the experiment, the control population was not supposed to receive the BDH.  In reality 38 
percent receive it.  The treatment group is 73 percent more likely to receive BDH the control 
population, but the considerable leakage means that our empirical work later will need to be an 
intent-to-treat type analysis. 
 
 
4  Several other studies have considered the impact of BDH transfers: Paxson and Schady 
(2008) show that transfers improved the health and development of preschool-aged children, and 
Schady and Rosero (2008) show that a higher fraction of transfer income is used on food than is 
the case with other sources of income.  Most directly related to this paper, Schady and Araujo 
(2008) show that the program had large effects on child schooling.  Though the transfers are 
small - 8.9 percent of expenditures in median household – the impact they have on children 
seems to be large.   
  Time allocation is available in the BDH evaluation data for children 6 to 17.  Table 2 
summarizes their time allocation in the baseline data by the child's treatment status.  There are no 
statistically significant differences in activities at baseline between the treatment and control 
samples.  Three-fourths of children attend school, and three fourths work in domestic work such 
as cooking, cleaning, and other household chores.  Less than half participate in market work.  
Most that do are engaged in unpaid family work.  Less than one in ten children participate in 
market work for pay. 
 
3.  The effect of the BDH on child labor supply 
3.1 Set-up 
In this section, we examine the response of child labor supply to the BDH transfer in a 
simple version of the model of child labor supply developed in Basu and Van (1998, hereafter 
BV).  We consider the case of a two person household, one adult and one child.  The BV model 
is built on two explicit assumptions.  First, child and adult labor are perfect substitutes subject to 
a productivity shifter, a.  One child worker is equivalent to α adult workers,  1 α < .  This is 
known as the substitution axiom.   is the child's labor income,  is adult labor income (adult 
labor supply is inelastic).  Equilibrium between the child and adult labor markets and the 
substitution axiom, together, imply
c w A w
cA ww α = . 
  Second, child labor occurs only if family income is very low.  Denote  as the perceived 
subsistence level of family i.   is the family's consumption.  This second assumption, the luxury 





,0 ,1  if 















  eq.  (1) 
 
 
5for all  0 δ > .  We think this characterization of preferences is most appropriately applied to the 
decision to send children to work outside of the family farm or business.
1  Hence, we use work 
for pay outside of the family farm or business as our definition of child labor in the empirical 
portion of this study.  Of course, we examine the transfer's effect on other forms of work as well 
in our empirical analysis. 
  The discontinuity in child labor supply implied by the luxury axiom is central to BV's 
proof of the possibility of multiple equilibria for child labor supply in an economy.
 2  Hence, the 
luxury axiom has been the focus of a large body of research.  Tests of the luxury axiom typically 
look at whether child labor is income elastic.  A negative income elasticity of child labor follows 
out of any Becker (1965) style time allocation model where leisure or an alternative use of time 
outside of work is a normal good (see for example, Cigno and Rosati 2005).  In fact, the luxury 
axiom as codified in equation (1) does not imply that child labor is income elastic for all levels of 
income.  Child labor does not respond to increases in income when such increases leave the 
household unable to cover subsistence costs, for example.  Edmonds (2005) argues that, if we 
accept that households will vary in their perceptions of subsistence costs, the luxury axiom 
implies that the relationship between child labor and family living standards should be flat, and 
then decline rapidly in the range of perceived subsistence levels.   He documents that the changes 
in child labor in Vietnam in the 1990s are consistent with what would be implied by the luxury 
axiom. 
  The baseline data in the BDH evaluation are consistent with the basic pattern implied by 
equation (1) of rapid declines in child labor after a certain standard of living is attained.  Figure 1 
contains the plot of participation rates in work for pay outside of the household for children 6-16 
against the log of annual per capita expenditures in the baseline, pre-BDH, data.  The curve in 
                                                 
1 Across countries, work for pay outside of the child's family is less prevalent and associated with lower school 
attendance rates than other forms of work.  The lower school attendance rates among children who work for pay 
outside of the household across countries can be explained by differences in hours worked (Edmonds 2007).  Work 
for pay outside of the household may be associated with less flexibility in hours worked and greater intensity for all 
of the reasons typically offered for the lumpiness of formal wage employment in the adult labor market.  Families 
may view work for pay outside of the home differently than other forms of work because of its greater intensity 
directly, the implied incompatibility with schooling, or discomfort with having children working outside of the 
home. 
2 Swinnerton and Rogers (1999) emphasize that the multiple equilibrium result implicitly depends on the assumption 
that the distribution of capital income is sufficiently unequal. 
 
 
6Figure 1 is the result of a non-parametric (local-linear) regression.
3  The curve does not represent 
a causal relationship and should not be taken as a prediction to what will happen to work outside 
of the child's household as they grow wealthier or receive the BDH transfer (as we discuss 
below).  Nonetheless, the shape of the curve in figure 1 is striking.  From the bottom of the 
distribution until monthly per capita expenditures are approximately $20 per person per month 
(when the log of annual per capita expenditures is 5.5), participation rates in work for pay 
outside of the household are roughly flat.  After $20 per person per month, participation rates 
decline very rapidly.  In the wealthiest households in the evaluation sample (drawn from the 
poorest two quintiles in Ecuador), participation rates in market work outside of the household are 
one-third of what they are for the poorest families. 
  Heterogeneity in perceived subsistence levels is necessary to reconcile preferences such 
as equation (1) with the data and seems realistic.  We model the family's perception of basic 
subsistence needs as having three components:  the costs of maintaining a child h, the costs of 
educating the child k, and an idiosyncratic perception that is normally distributed with a mean 0 
and variance 1.  Both the maintenance and education costs vary with the child's age. Denote the 
age of the child in family i as  .  Hence, the family's perception of its subsistence needs can be 
written as: 
i a
( ) ( ) ii i sh a k a i ε =+−    eq. (2) 
with  .  We assume that both h and k are everywhere differentiable and increasing in 
child age. 
( 0,1 i N ε   )
                                                
  The assumption that maintenance costs increase with age follows from the increasing 
nutritional and energy requirements associated with puberty, physical growth, and increased 
physical intensity of work with age (over the ages relevant for our discussion).  Schooling costs 
include school fees, schooling inputs, transport costs, etc.  Conceptually, schooling costs may 
also include the family's perceived opportunity cost of child time in schooling if this opportunity 
cost is not determined by adult wages.  Opportunity costs would increase with age with the 
child's ability to work and contribute productively.  Direct schooling costs also increase with age.  
Figure 2 plots schooling costs per child by age for children that attend school in our data.  
Primary school is technically free in Ecuador, but families still face costs for transport, uniforms, 
 
3 We follow Fan and Gijbels (1995) nearest neighbor adaptive bandwidth selection rule for 60 nearest neighbors 
(approximately 2 percent of sample).  We use a Gaussian kernel. 
 
 
7learning materials, and some other fees.  Secondary school is not free and, at secondary school 
ages, direct schooling expenditures per child appear to be double their primary school age level 
(although part of this difference may be a result of differences in which families send older 
children to school). 
  The family chooses consumption  and whether the child works in the formal labor 
market.   is an indicator that is 1 if the child works in the formal labor market and 0 otherwise.  
The household then maximizes utility 
i c
i e
(1) subject to the budget constraint: 
ii c A ce wwt i ≤ ++  eq.  (3) 
where  is the household's non-labor income.  Child labor supply and consumption then depend 
on whether adult labor income and non-labor income are enough to cover subsistence expenses.  
Liquidity constraints, as in Baland and Robinson (2000), are implicit within this model.  




             if   








⎧+ + ≥ ⎪ = ⎨ ++ + < ⎪ ⎩ i
 eq. (4) 
0  if   








= ⎨ + < ⎩
    eq.  (5). 
  An interesting attribute of this model is that implies that increases in income can result in 
declines in consumption.  Assume non-satiation in consumption so that the budget constraint (3) 
holds with equality:  ( ) 1 ii A ce w α =+ + i t i .  Suppose  A ws <  so that without the transfer, the child 
works and expenditures are:  .  Suppose that the transfer is sufficient to switch the 
family from having the child work to not: 
( 1 i c α =+) A w
Ai wt i s + ≥ .  Expenditures are then  .  If  iA cwt =+ i
A iA i sw t w α −≤ ≤ , then household expenditures fall with the transfer relative to what 
expenditures would be absent the transfer.  The family is still better off.  This result that the 
transfer can decrease family income follows directly out of the assumption on preferences in 
equation (1).   
 
3.2  The effects of the cash transfer 
The probability a child works for pay is the probability that the family's income absent 
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Given the assumption  , we have  ( 0,1 i N ε   )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Pr 1 ii i eF h a k a w == + − − A i t  eq.  (6) 
where F is the cumulative normal.   
  Three factors that influence whether the child works are emphasized in equation (6):  the 
child's age, adult wages, and the transfer.  Totally differentiating, we have: 
() ( ) ( ) () ( ) ( )
Pr 1
ii
ii i A i A i d t (7) 
ha ka
de f h ak aw t d a d w
aa
⎛⎞ ∂∂ ⎛⎞
== + − − + − − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
   eq. 
where f() is the standard normal density and is assumed to be everywhere positive.  Higher 
maintenance and education costs increase the probability that we observe a child working.  
Additional adult income or non-labor transfers reduce the incidence of child labor.   
The change in schooling costs (associated with age) in equation (7) is: () () i ka ad a ∂∂ .  
Changes in schooling costs have the same effect on the incidence in child labor as does an 
equivalently valued increase in transfers or adult income.  Put another way, the implication of 
our set-up is that families consider whether they can afford to not send their children to work.  
They come to the same conclusion whether they are sufficiently rich or alternative uses of the 
child’s time are sufficiently inexpensive.  This point is important in interpreting the empirical 
results later in this study.  Whether the BDH transfer affects child labor by increasing incomes 
absent child labor or lowering the perceived costs of schooling (because of misperceptions in 
some households that receipt of the transfer requires schooling, Schady and Araujo 2008), the 
BDH transfer causes the decision to forego work to become relatively more affordable. 
  There is substantial heterogeneity between children in the effect of the transfer.  Assume 
that the transfer does not influence equilibrium wages in the local labor market.  Holding age 
constant, the change in the incidence of child labor in a family that starts receiving the transfer is 
then: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) Pr 1 ii i de f h ak aw == − + − A  eq.  (8) 
 
 
9The magnitude of the reduction in child labor with the BDH transfer depends on subsistence 
costs and adult income.  Child labor supply will be more elastic to the transfer to households 
closer to the margin in the sense of  A ws i ≈ .  That is, for families where adult income is well 
above subsistence, the transfer will not influence child labor supply, because subsistence needs is 
not a motive for child labor.  For very poor households, with adult income well below the 
subsistence level, it is unlikely that a small transfer such as the BDH will be sufficient to 
eliminate the need to have a child work.  The effect of the transfer should therefore be largest for 
families who are close to subsistence absent child labor. 
  The effects of the transfer will vary with the child's age.  Differentiating equation (8) with 
respect to age, we find: 
()






fh a k a w
aa
= ⎛⎞ ∂⎜⎟ ∂∂ ⎛⎞ ⎝⎠ ′ =− + − + ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ⎝⎠
i
a ∂
. eq. (9) 
f' is the derivative of the density function at its argument (the difference between average 
subsistence costs and adult wages at age a).  Both maintenance and schooling costs increase in 
age.  Whether the impact of the transfer increases or decreases with age then depends on whether 
or not the child works (that is, whether adult income is above or below subsistence costs).  
Suppose the child works for pay at baseline,   ( ) ( ) ii ha ka w A + > .  This implies that  and 
thereby
0 f ′ >
() () Pr 1 0 ii de d ta ∂= ∂ <
A
.  Among children who are working, the impact of the transfer 
is smaller as they age.  Alternatively, suppose children are not working at baseline, 
.  The effect of the transfer then gets larger as children age:  () () ii ha ka w +<
() () Pr 1 0 ii de d ta ∂= ∂ > t  .  Given that schooling costs appear to increase dramatically starting a
age 12 and with the primary to secondary school transitions, this discussion suggests that the 
impact of the BDH should be largest for children age 10 or larger who do not work at baseline.  
Moreover, as the value of the normal density f is greatest when its argument is closest to zero, the 
impact of the transfer on children at the transition ages should be largest for poorer children 
whose adult income absent child labor is closer to subsistence,  Ai ws ≈ . 
  An examination of the baseline data is useful to identify what ages are most likely to be 
affected by the BDH transfer.  Figure 3 pools baseline data for both the treatment and control 
 
 
10populations and plots participation rates at baseline by type of activity and age.
4  Paid market 
work does not appear in the dataset until age 12 and does not exceed 20 percent of children until 
age 15.  Schooling is nearly universal ages 6 through 11 and begins to decline rapidly thereafter, 
with the largest declines occurring between ages 12 and 13.  The age patterns in schooling and 
paid market work are more vivid than those for work categories that take place inside the child's 
own home.  Overall, unpaid market work occurs in the family farm or business, and by age 8, 
nearly 40 percent of children participate in unpaid market work.  The prevalence of domestic 
work grows rapidly between age 6 and 9, and appears to be relatively stable thereafter.   
Figure 3 has two implications for our empirical work.  First, given the age patterns in 
child time allocation it seems that there is little scope for a transfer to affect child involvement in 
paid work at ages 11 and under.  Hence, we focus our analysis on children age 10 and above at 
baseline.  Second, it is striking how the timing of the decline in schooling matches the growth in 
work for pay.  This reflects the fact that when children transition from school to work, it is often 
paid work that they are transitioning to, especially in poorer households.  Given that much of the 
variation in child time allocation with age in this population is from increases in work for pay 
and decline in schooling, we anticipate that the largest impact of the transfer will be on work for 
pay, rather than participation in unpaid market work in the child's home. 
 
4. Main  findings 
4.1 Empirical  methods 
Our empirical strategy approach follows from equation (6).  Adult wages are determined 
by local labor markets.  We treat the parish as the labor market and include parish fixed effects 
p λ .  Maintenance and education costs vary by child age and possibly gender.  We include a full 
set of age dummies  a λ and a gender effect g.  Non-labor transfers are affected by winning the 
BDH lottery.  In our reduced form approach, we include an indicator for whether the family won 
the BDH lottery l as our measure of  :  i t
ip p a i r i ip eg l α λλβ γ ε =+ + + + +  eq.  (10) 
                                                 
4 Figure 3 ends at age 16 in the baseline data, because the evaluation did not collect time allocation information for 
children above 17 in the treatment period. 
 
 
11where  ip ε is an error term that is 0 in expectation conditional on the other controls listed in 
equation (10).  Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.   
  In our preferred specification, we estimate equation (10), replacing  with an indicator for 
whether the family receives the BDH transfer as our measure of  (the transfer does not vary 
among recipients).  38 percent of control households report receiving the BDH transfer, despite 
their exclusion from it in the evaluation design.  Hence, take-up of the BDH transfer is non-
random but the lottery is random by design.  The lottery nearly doubles the probability that a 
household reports receiving the BDH transfer.  Hence, we use the lottery indicator  as an 
instrumental variable for  . The assumption in the instrumental variable specification is that the 






  We examine the impact of winning the BDH lottery on child time allocation for each of 
the different indicators of child time allocation described in table 2.  For each outcome, e, we 
report reduced forms of winning the lottery and instrumental variables estimates of the impact of 
receiving the transfer.  Our discussion of age trends above suggests that we would be unlikely to 
find an effect of the cash transfer at ages below 12.  On average, there is 1.5 years between pre 
and post baseline data.  Conservatively, we then expect the treatment to only be evident in 
children as young as 10 in baseline.  We bifurcate the sample into above and below age 10 in 
estimating (10) 
  Our theoretical discussion suggests that the effect of the transfer should be largest on the 
child on the margin between schooling and work.  We identify marginal children in three ways.  
First, children working at baseline are revealed to have subsistence needs above adult income 
absent the transfer.  With age, subsistence needs increase.  Given the small value of the transfer, 
we expect its effect on work to be largest among children who are not working at baseline but are 
vulnerable to transitioning to work.  Our first additional restriction is to look at children age 10 
and above at baseline who attend school without participating in market work.  Second, children 
are most likely to transition from school to work at the end of primary as direct schooling costs 
increase dramatically and perhaps there is a labor market return to primary.  Our second 
additional restriction (in addition to greater than age 10 and older at baseline, in school, and not 
working) is to focus on children near or beyond the end of primary.  We limit the sample to 
 
 
12children who do not work and are in grade five or higher.  (There are six grades in primary 
school in Ecuador.)  
  Third, we block children by the probability that they transition from this no work / 
schooling group to working.  Specifically, for children 10 and older, we restrict the sample to the 
control population.  We regress an indicator that a child participates in market work in the post 
round on age effects, gender effects, urbanity, parish fixed effects, baseline time allocation, and a 
second order polynomial in the natural log of per capita expenditures that we allow to vary with 
age*gender.  We use the predicted probabilities from this regression to divide the entire 
evaluation sample into three equally sized groups:  those with low, middle, and high probabilities 
of transitioning to work for pay.   
 
4.2  At school to work transition ages, market work and work for pay decline with 
additional income 
Children age 10 and older who receive the additional BDH transfer income are less likely 
to work in market work, work for pay, unpaid market work.  They are more likely to work in 
domestic work.  The increase in domestic work is smaller than the decline in market work, and is 
similar in magnitude to the decline in work for pay outside of the child’s family.  The probability 
that a child works without enrolling in school decreases.  The probability that a child enrolls in 
school increases.  These findings are in table 3 for the full sample age 10+, separately for boys 
and girls, and separately for rural and urban. 
  Each cell in table 3 contains the result from a different regression.  For each population 
grouping (e.g. full sample, male, urban, etc.), the first line contains the reduced form coefficient 
on the lottery winner indicator from estimating equation (10) with the dependent variable 
indicated by the column header.  The second line contains the coefficient from a separate 
regression of the dependent variable indicated by the column on an indicator for whether the 
family receives the BDH, with random assignment used as an instrumental variable.  Thus, 
winning the BDH lottery is associated with an 8 percentage point decline in the probability a 
children age 10+ at baseline works in market work in the post round, a 15 percent decline.  
Slightly less than a third of those that win the BDH lottery do not take-up the transfer, and more 
than one-third who should not receive the transfer do so.  The impact of actually receiving the 
BDH, correcting for the endogeneity in this decision, suggests that receipt of the BDH reduces 
 
 
13market work by 24 percentage points, or just under 50 percent.  The BDH income increases 
school enrollment by 18 percentage points or 26 percent. 
  Changes in market work, especially work for pay, associated with BDH income increase 
substantially when we focus our analysis on children that are most vulnerable to a school to work 
transition.  In table 4 and remaining tables, we only present instrumental variables results of the 
effect of BDH receipt for economy.  We limit the population used to estimate table 4 to children 
10 and older who attend school and do not work in baseline.  As discussed above, these children 
are most likely to be affected by the transfer.  In fact, we observe a 44 percentage point decline 
in market work and a statistically significant 20 percentage point decline in the probability that a 
child participates in work for pay.  The magnitude of the increase in domestic work (although not 
statistically significant) also increases.  This implies a degree of substitutability between work 
for pay and domestic work that is not typically found in the data.  School enrollment is also more 
elastic to the BDH transfer in this vulnerable group relative to the general age 10+ population. 
  Magnitudes are still greater when we focus on children who are most likely to complete 
primary school or higher during our evaluation period.  Table 5 presents our main findings of the 
impact of the BDH transfer for children 10 and older, in school in grade 4 or higher, and not 
working at baseline.  Market work declines by nearly 50 percentage points and work for pay by 
nearly 30 percentage points.  School enrollment is increased in this group by nearly 40 
percentage points relative to the comparable population that does not receive the transfer.  
Effects on work for pay and schooling are largest for girls and in rural areas.  These results are 
consistent with the overall idea that the effects of the additional income are largest for children 
that are most close to the margin of subsistence as both rural areas and girls have faster school to 
work transitions than urban areas and boys. 
  We see much smaller effects of the BDH transfer in populations that we expect to be 
further from the margin of subsistence.  These findings are in table 6.  Children under 10 at 
baseline experience much smaller changes in time allocation compared to children 10 and over.  
This is to be expected as perceptions of subsistence will generally be lower because of lower 
maintenance costs and direct and indirect schooling costs.  Hence, younger children are more 
likely to be in school regardless of the transfer.  Children that are working at baseline also are 
less impacted by the transfer.  Children 10 and older that are working and not attending school at 
baseline already have revealed that their subsistence level is above adult income absent the 
 
 
14child’s labor.  This difference will only grow with the child’s age, and it seems unlikely that a 
small transfer will radically affect the family’s perception of the need for the child’s work.  In 
fact, we see little change in child time allocation for this population (the second row of table 6). 
  Children that are away from the end of primary school are also less likely to be impacted 
by the transfer.  They face lower direct schooling costs (and perhaps indirect costs if there is a 
return to primary completion).  Hence, they are less likely to transition out of school to work in 
the 1.5 years between the pre and post periods.  Changes in time use associated with BDH 
receipt for this population are in the bottom row of table 6.  While they do experience declines in 
unpaid market work (work in the family farm or business) that is greater in magnitude than the 
population completing primary school or higher during the evaluation period (table 5), this 
school group does not experience the changes in work for pay or school enrollment observed in 
the population that completes primary school during this evaluation period.  That is, for this 
relatively less schooling-advanced population, the transfer seems to forestall participation in the 
family farm and business, but this group is not especially vulnerable to transitioning to work for 
pay and no schooling.  Schooling is most likely to be orthogonal with paid rather than unpaid 
market work for a variety of reasons, including flexibility in the time and the hours worked.  
Hence, the effect of the transfer on types of work that is most incompatible with schooling is 
largest amongst the population transitioning from primary school or higher grades. 
  The analysis associated with tables 4 through 6 is based on inferring who is most likely to 
be transitioning from schooling to work for pay, based on baseline age and school / work status.  
An alternative is to estimate the child’s transition probability directly using the control sample 
and taking into account the child’s family’s baseline living standards.  These results are in table 7 
where we trifurcate children into groups based on the probability that they transition from 
schooling to work for pay during the evaluation period.  While the declines in market work are 
similar in all groups, this is driven by declines in work in the family farm or business in most of 
the population.  It is only the group that is most vulnerable to transition where the decline in 
work is concentrated in work for pay.  Similarly, it is only this group with the highest probability 
of transitioning from school to work where we see schooling effects of the transfer as well.  
Thus, the effect of the transfer on child labor and schooling can be very large, but its effects 
seem fairly concentrated in one segment of the population. 
 
 
154.3  School expenditures increase but per capita expenditures do not increase 
significantly with additional income 
The BDH transfer is $15 per family per month.  Our estimates imply that families spend 
an additional $42 per child per year on schooling as a result of the transfer.  This is $4.7 per 
month of the school year (the school year is 9 months).  With 1.8 children per recipient 
household, more than half of the transfer is spent on the direct schooling costs of children.  These 
findings are in table 8. 
  Table 8 mimics table 3 in its construction.  Each cell in the table comes from a different 
regression.  Instrumental variables are presented for the full sample, male/female, and 
urban/rural.  The first column contains the simple difference in annual school expenses per child 
in the post sample.  The second column looks at changes in annual schooling expenditure per 
child between the pre and post periods.  Given random assignment, it is expected that the first 
difference results look qualitatively similar to the double difference results in column 2, and we 
see this.  Hence, we focus on the first difference results in column 1 for discussion.  The increase 
in schooling expenditures is largest for girls and in rural areas.  This is similar to the patterns in 
school enrollment observed in table 3.   
  Total expenditures do not appear to increase substantively with the cash transfer despite 
greater school expenditures.
5  The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is total annual 
household expenditures.  In the full sample, an additional $15 per month is associated with a 
$213 reduction in annual expenditures, or $18 less per month.  The decline in total expenditures 
is largest for households with girls; girls also experience larger increase in school expenses 
(column 1) and the largest decline in work for pay (tables 3-5).   
  In fact, the decline in expenditures appears largest in families of children that were most 
vulnerable to transitioning from schooling to work for pay.  This finding is explicit in table 9 
which mimics the trifurcation of the data from table 7.  Schooling expenditures per child increase 
by $77 per child per year with BDH receipt ($8.5 per month, $15.4 per household per month) 
among these children whose probability of attending school increases by 43 percentage points.  
Annual household expenditures decline by $430, $36 per month.  Thus, while schooling 
expenses increase considerably relative to the control population with these children whose 
                                                 
5 Schooling expenditures are included in total expenditures. 
 
 
16schooling status is protected with the transfer, overall their family seems to forego considerable 
consumption in order to send children to school rather than work for pay.   
These expenditure results are consistent with the results from table 7.  In households most 
likely to transition to work, the BDH is associated with an additional $77 in schooling expenses 
per year, or $8.5 per month per child.  There are 1.8 children, so total expenditures on education 
rise by $15.  However, this increase in education experiences comes with a decline in income.  
The average monthly wage for a child in the control population working for wages in the post 
period is $84 per month.  The probability a child works for pay declines by 37 percentage points 
for children most likely to transition to work.  On average, then, a 37 percentage point decline in 
the probability that a child works earning $84 per month costs a household $31 in foregone 
income per child or $56 for its 1.8 children.  The additional transfer income of $15 per month 
implies that total household income declines by $41 per month assuming no other behavioral 
changes.  This is $5 above the $36 decline directly estimated in the data in table 9, one hundredth 
of the standard error on the estimated $36 decline. 
The model of section 3 posits a simple explanation for this surprising observation.  
Absent the transfer, families do not perceive themselves as able to cover their subsistence needs 
without child labor.  The BDH transfer makes it more affordable for the family to continue the 




Work for pay among children in Ecuador is concentrated in the poorest households, and 
children appear to transition from school to work for pay starting at age 12.  We find that a 
randomly assigned cash transfer maintains school enrollment and leads to a decline in work for 
pay among children vulnerable to transitioning from school to work.  The declines in work for 
pay and increases in schooling, relative to the control population, are largest for girls and in rural 
areas.  The additional income appears to have little influence on child time allocation or 
schooling related expenditures for children below school transition ages or already working and 
out of school in our baseline data.  Among children vulnerable to transitioning from school to 
work, we observe a substantial increase in school related expenditures.  Most of the cash transfer 
appears to be spent on schooling in this population.  Despite increased school expenditures, the 
 
 
17decline in work for pay is large enough that total expenditures decline in families with children 
whose schooling is prolonged by the transfer.  The decline in total expenditures is very close in 
magnitude to the foregone income implied by our estimates of the decline in work for pay. 
  The Basu and Van (1998) set-up offers a simple theoretical interpretation of these results.  
It posits that children work when families feel they cannot afford alternatives to that work.  For 
families vulnerable to transitioning from school to work, the transfer improves their ability to 
afford schooling.  Hence, they forego the child labor income, total expenditures decline, and 
families are better off as a result.
6 
   It is striking that for children vulnerable to transitioning from school to work, families 
appear to use all of the transfer to support child schooling and defer the transition to work for 
pay.  To the extent that this educational investment is productive and multiplier effects from 
education are substantive, our finding suggests potentially very high aggregate returns to small, 
well-targeted transfers.  But why would families invest so heavily to sustaining the education of 
these children at transition ages?  The Basu-Van set-up frames the answer in terms of 
preferences, but why might preferences be such?  The answer might depend on whether the 
transfer is perceived as transitory or permanent.  If it is transitory, our findings are consistent 
with education as the highest return savings vehicle available to these poor families.  If 
permanent, our findings may reflect nothing more than parental preferences (education or the 
absence of child labor brings utility directly) or something about liquidity constraints (education 
is the best long-term investment available and liquidity constraints were constraining 
investment).  Of course, surrounding the transfer program is a social marketing campaign 
promoting investments in child human capital.  It is possible that the results herein reflect a 
behavioral response to a combination of the cash transfer and the social marketing campaign.  
We do not have a comparable experiment to suggest how families would treat a similarly sized 
lottery award without the social marketing context.  Understanding why families appear to 
prioritize schooling and the absence of child labor to the extent observed here is an interesting 
avenue for future research. 
 
                                                 
6 This is a result of the "luxury axiom" in the model.  The Basu and Van setting frames the child labor decision in 
the language of preferences.  However, it is trivial to recharacterize the model as being one where child labor is 
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Figure 1:  Work for Pay outside of the Household and Per Capita Expenditures at Baseline 
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Variable Treatment  Control Treatment  Control
Enrolled in School 0.767 0.770 0.696 0.704
Highest Grade Completed 4.620 4.589 5.693 5.650
Any Market Work 0.475 0.463 0.521 0.514
Paid Market Work 0.092 0.094 0.121 0.123
Unpaid market work 0.404 0.389 0.428 0.417
Domestic Work 0.798 0.787 0.823 0.827



















‐0.0778** ‐0.0228 ‐0.0667** 0.0157 ‐0.0634** 0.0581**
(0.0231) (0.0166) (0.0203) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0222)
‐0.244** ‐0.0716 ‐0.209** 0.0492 ‐0.199** 0.182**
(0.0719) (0.0537) (0.0608) (0.0634) (0.0652) (0.0764)
Male
‐0.0941** ‐0.0140 ‐0.0778** 0.0161 ‐0.0338 0.0226
(0.0333) (0.0304) (0.0246) (0.0279) (0.0348) (0.0377)
‐0.294** ‐0.0439 ‐0.243** 0.0505 ‐0.106 0.0707
(0.105) (0.0962) (0.0705) (0.0900) (0.108) (0.118)
Female
‐0.0604** ‐0.0288 ‐0.0504* 0.0180 ‐0.0906** 0.0875**
(0.0255) (0.0213) (0.0268) (0.0221) (0.0272) (0.0314)
‐0.191** ‐0.0910 ‐0.159* 0.0569 ‐0.286** 0.276**
(0.0798) (0.0657) (0.0865) (0.0728) (0.0845) (0.105)
Rural
‐0.0686** ‐0.0406 ‐0.0443 0.0165 ‐0.0583** 0.0587*
(0.0331) (0.0252) (0.0280) (0.0305) (0.0264) (0.0312)
‐0.220* ‐0.130 ‐0.142 0.0528 ‐0.187* 0.188
(0.112) (0.0851) (0.0882) (0.102) (0.0979) (0.117)
Urban
‐0.0936** ‐0.00651 ‐0.0925** 0.0175 ‐0.0698** 0.0592*
(0.0319) (0.0220) (0.0271) (0.0246) (0.0320) (0.0320)
‐0.296** ‐0.0205 ‐0.292** 0.0553 ‐0.221** 0.187*













































‐0.440** ‐0.199** ‐0.247** 0.157 ‐0.277** 0.299**
(0.136) (0.0946) (0.103) (0.115) (0.0934) (0.114)
Male
‐0.505** ‐0.175 ‐0.233 0.331 ‐0.243 0.250
(0.233) (0.180) (0.169) (0.226) (0.187) (0.203)
Female
‐0.417** ‐0.239** ‐0.241 0.131 ‐0.361** 0.394**
(0.145) (0.113) (0.149) (0.117) (0.155) (0.180)
Rural
‐0.677** ‐0.379* ‐0.233 0.207 ‐0.368* 0.377*
(0.329) (0.224) (0.240) (0.343) (0.191) (0.207)
Urban
‐0.416** ‐0.137 ‐0.315** 0.156 ‐0.246** 0.272*



































‐0.493** ‐0.290** ‐0.166 0.117 ‐0.376** 0.378**
(0.148) (0.122) (0.126) (0.145) (0.109) (0.123)
Male
‐0.600* ‐0.298 ‐0.105 0.230 ‐0.346* 0.323
(0.329) (0.273) (0.258) (0.310) (0.204) (0.241)
Female
‐0.559** ‐0.326** ‐0.275 0.171 ‐0.383** 0.400*
(0.185) (0.155) (0.169) (0.151) (0.188) (0.207)
Rural
‐0.663* ‐0.529* ‐0.00269 0.0946 ‐0.510** 0.512**
(0.355) (0.268) (0.265) (0.370) (0.168) (0.206)
Urban
‐0.507** ‐0.211 ‐0.304* 0.147 ‐0.339** 0.340**




































‐0.117 0.0205 ‐0.143 0.0827 0.0853** ‐0.0401
(0.125) (0.0275) (0.123) (0.170) (0.0423) (0.0520)
Children 10 and older, in market work, and not in school at baseline
0.0385 0.118 ‐0.102 ‐0.120 0.0129 0.000574
(0.102) (0.118) (0.129) (0.117) (0.134) (0.123)
Children 10 and older, in school in grade 3 or lower, and not in market work at baseline
‐0.454 0.00548 ‐0.494* 0.380 0.00775 0.0906
















Transition Probability: Lowest Middle Highest
Participation Indicator For:
Receives BDH (2SLS) ‐0.218** ‐0.316** ‐0.245*
(0.101) (0.0907) (0.134)
Work for Pay
Receives BDH (2SLS) 0.0674 0.00543 ‐0.365**
(0.0493) (0.0707) (0.130)
Unpaid Market Work
Receives BDH (2SLS) ‐0.262** ‐0.336** 0.00634
(0.106) (0.0862) (0.104)
Domestic Work
Receives BDH (2SLS) ‐0.0101 0.0447 0.121
(0.100) (0.0936) (0.115)
Work w/o School
Receives BDH (2SLS) ‐0.140 ‐0.127 ‐0.447**
(0.120) (0.0831) (0.140)
Enrolled in School






































41.64* 43.40** ‐213.3 ‐168.5
(23.62) (21.04) (338.2) (340.0)
Male
11.63 26.28 ‐25.42 13.89
(29.91) (26.39) (321.6) (333.0)
Female
58.57* 48.85 ‐353.5 ‐277.0
(32.55) (31.39) (480.5) (471.4)
Rural
65.12** 47.61 ‐118.4 ‐106.4
(29.79) (28.36) (426.8) (409.3)
Urban
18.50 39.94 ‐305.5 ‐243.4




















Transition Probability: Lowest Middle Highest
Receives BDH (2SLS) 34.62 40.60 77.19**
(49.16) (37.83) (37.59)
Total Household Expenditures
Receives BDH (2SLS) 158.9 ‐232.5 ‐430.0
(430.2) (495.8) (470.3)
Notes:
1
2
3
4
5
Standard errors in parentheses.  Standard errors corrected for Parish level clustering.
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05
Table 9:  Changes in Household Expenditures with the BDH by estimated transition 
probabilities
Per Child School Expenditures
Each cell contains the result from a different regression.  The row heading (column 1) 
indicates the dependent variable.  Receives BDH reports the coefficient on an indicator that 
the child's family receives the BDH, using the random assignment as an instrumental 
variable.
All regressions include parish fixed effects, a vector of age dummies, and controls for gender 
and urbanity.
The full sample of children age 10 and older at baseline is trifurcated based on the predicted 
probability the child transitions to working for pay described in the text and in table 7.